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Abstract 
 
Purpose- This study aims to empirically explore corporate governance and the demographic 
traits of top management teams as the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices in 
listed banks. This study also aims to contribute to the existing risk disclosure literature by 
investigating the effect of a combination of determinants on voluntary risk disclosure practices 
in an emerging market. Furthermore, this study seeks to contribute to risk disclosure theories by 
employing the upper echelons theory to examine the determinants and their effects on voluntary 
risk disclosure practices. 
Design/Methodology/Approach- This investigation uses manual content analysis to measure the 
levels of risk disclosure in all Saudi listed banks from 2009 to 2013. It also uses ordinary least 
squares regressions analysis to examine the joint effect of corporate governance and 
demographic traits on risk disclosure. 
Results- The empirical findings show that external ownership, audit committee meetings, gender, 
size, profitability and board size are primary determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices 
in Saudi listed banks. The remainder of the independent variables of both corporate governance 
mechanisms and demographic traits are insignificantly correlated with voluntary risk 
disclosure practices in Saudi listed banks. This study supports upper echelons theory and further 
encompasses demographic research into the risk disclosure field. 
Potential Implications- The empirical findings offer several important implications by reporting 
to banks’ stockholder, regulatory bodies and any other interested group on the importance of 
corporate governance and demographic determinants, which can be used to augment risk 
reporting in the banking industry. This study also backs upper echelons theory and encourages 
further demographic research into the risk disclosure field. 
Originality- To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no prior research has been conducted on 
the determinants of risk disclosure in Saudi Arabian listed banks. Therefore, this is the first 
study to investigate the determinants of risk disclosure in the context of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Keywords: Banks, Saudi Arabia, Risk Disclosure Determinants, Upper Echelons Theory, Board 
Demography 
 
 
 
1.INTRODUCTION 
 
Regulatory institutions have had to reconsider   the basis of banking regulations due to the global financial crisis. 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Erkens et al. (2012) argued that this event resulted in serious concerns regarding risk 
disclosures. Due to this catastrophic corporate failure, investors’ and stakeholders’ attention has been drawn to the 
importance of risk reporting (Linsely et al., 2008). These concerns are coherent with the argument put forward 
by Meier et al. (1995), Schrand and Elliot (1998), Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Cabedo and Tirado (2004), Ahmed 
et al. (2004), Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton (2006), Linsley and Shrives (2006), Abraham and Cox (2007), Linsley 
and Lawrence (2007) and Hassan (2009), which is that risk disclosure is a pivotal aspect of business risks, where 
reporting offers greater transparency and enhances investors’ confidence. As is evident, the global crisis also 
resulted in a deceleration of the global economy and thus the demand for risk reporting increased. This had led to 
a number of regulatory reforms, for example, the birth of the International Financial Reporting Standard 7 Financial 
Instruments and BASEL II, which includes greater measures on risk transparency and disclosure. It also emphasises 
the significance of informative risk disclosure in the banking industry for the overall enhancement of market 
 
 discipline. The disclosure of informative risk information in banks has been cited as instrumental in eluding banking 
catastrophes (Financial Stability Board, 2012). 
Disclosure of financial risk information is important since it increases transparency, thus giving shareholders’ 
more confidence and lowering their uncertainty about future cash flow as well as making it more viable for 
corporations to obtain external funding at a cost of capital, hence increasing capital market activities in general 
(Deumes, 1999; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Kothari et al., 2009). Institutions are encouraged not only    to report 
their activities but also the risks associated with them as well as their strategy for and capacity to manage these 
risks (ICAEW, 1999). 
However, prior research shows that financial statements suffer from serious deficiencies and inadequacies in 
terms of the provision of risk and uncertainty disclosures (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). One of the main causes of the 
global financial disaster in 2007 was the absence of adequate risk disclosure available to investors. This dearth of 
risk disclosure prohibited investors from having adequate appropriate information to evaluate corporations’ risk 
reportage (Rahman, 1998). Solomon et al. (2000) found that institutional investors consider risk reporting 
inadequate in the UK. Therefore, this leaves investors unable to adequately assess a firm’s risk profile, and hence 
they are unable to deliberate on the scale and categories of risk in their venture decisions (Linsley et al., 2008). This 
dearth of risk information in annual reports indicates the necessity to examine the determinants of risk disclosure in 
different settings, particularly developing markets, such as in our case study, Saudi Arabia. 
Whilst previous literature discusses extensively the relationship between the determinants of risk disclosure in 
developed economies (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Linsely and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Konishi and 
Ali, 2007; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Hill and Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010), there is very little 
mention of developing markets (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdullah and Hassan, 2013). 
Furthermore, none of the preceding risk disclosure studies have investigated the impact of the joint effect of 
corporate governance and demographic variables on risk disclosure practices. This study aims to investigate risk 
disclosure practices in an emerging market, Saudi Arabia, empirically examining corporate governance and 
demographic traits as the determinants of risk reporting practices in Saudi listed banks. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, this is the only study that has attempted to examine the joint effect of corporate governance 
and demographic traits on risk disclosure in emerging markets, and thus this research makes a novel contribution 
to the existing accounting literature. Furthermore, this study contributes to the risk disclosure literature by employing 
upper echelons theory in order to examine the determinants and their effects on risk disclosure practises. In addition, 
this is the only study that examines the demographic traits of the board of directors in a developing country. In 
particular, this study contributes to the board demography, governance and risk disclosure literature by theoretically 
justifying and empirically investigating the implications of such determinants and theories in regards to risk 
disclosure in the banking industry. This study is motivated, firstly, by the call made by Dobler et al. (2011) for more 
investigation into the influence of corporate governance determinants on risk disclosure, especially in developing 
markets and, secondly, by the call made by Abdullah, Hassan and McClelland, (2015) for more research into the 
relationship between demographic characteristics and risk disclosure. 
This study differs from Mousa and Elamir (2013), Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) and Abdullah, Hassan and 
McClelland (2015), who examined a single attribute of corporate governance characteristic and from Amran, Bin 
and Hassan (2009), Hassan, (2009), Abdullah and Hassan (2013) and Al-Shammeri (2014), who did not investigate 
corporate governance and demographic attributes by comprehensively examining corporate risk disclosure and 
exploring demographic characteristics. Moreover, not a single study has examined corporate governance as a 
determinant of risk disclosure in the Saudi context. Also, not one of the above-mentioned studies explored the 
demographic traits of a top management team in emerging markets. This investigation differs from all of the above-
mentioned studies in that it examines the demographic characteristics of the top board of directors, employing 
upper echelons theory to examine risk reporting practices in the banking industry. Furthermore, this study differs 
from Amran, Bin and Hassan, (2009), Hassan, (2009), Abdullah and Hassan, (2013), Mousa and Elmir, (2013), 
Mokhtar and Mellett, (2013), Al-Shammeri, (2014) and Abdullah, Hassan and McClelland (2015) by being the first 
to examine risk disclosure over a period of five years in a developing economy. 
The empirical findings show that large banks with high outsider ownership, high profitability, high regularity 
of audit committee meetings and gender are more likely to demonstrate higher levels of risk disclosure practices. 
Also, risk disclosure is negatively affected by board size. Moreover, as can be seen from our empirical findings, 
external ownership, audit committee meetings, gender, size, profitability and board size are primary determinants 
of risk disclosure practices in Saudi listed banks, while the rest of the independent variables of both corporate 
governance mechanisms and demographic traits are insignificantly correlated with risk disclosure practices in Saudi 
listed bank. Our findings have several important implications for banks stockholder, regulatory bodies and any other 
interested group on the importance of corporate governance and demographic determinants, which can be used to 
augment risk reporting in the banking industry. This study also supports upper echelons theory and further 
encompasses demographic research into the risk disclosure field. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses the theoretical framework; section 3 
develops the hypotheses; section 4 outlines the research design and methodology; section 5 discusses empirical 
analysis; section 6 is the discussion; and section 7 offers conclusions. 
 
 
 2.CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANKING 
 
It   has   been   argued   that   compared   with other industries, the banking industry is the industry which has the 
highest requirements for corporate governance and disclosure regulations. As such industry is a financial 
intermediary body which is an important part in every country’s economy and has a major role in the financial 
system of that country (Khaled, 2008). Furthermore, the banking industry is based on trust, however banks as 
financial entities deal with all kinds of risks on a daily bases since it is a part of their business (Barakat and 
Hussainey, 2013).  Therefore, to keep public confidence   and decrease risks, Saudi banks need to have good 
financial performance and demonstrate corporate governance best practice. Such behaviour is greatly important for 
shareholders when considering investment decision makings. 
 
3.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Corporate governance has been defined by Solomon and Solomon (2004: 14) as “the system of checks and balances, 
both internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all 
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activities”. Also, Sharman and 
Copnell, (2002) defined corporate governance as “the system and process by which entities are directed and 
controlled to enhance performance and  sustainable shareholder value, and it is concerned with the effectiveness of 
management structure, the sufficiency and reliability of corporate reporting and the effectiveness of risk 
management systems”. 
The literature has established a robust relationship between disclosure and corporate governance. The FRC 
(2008) affirmed that management effectiveness, firm performance and shareholder value is supported by the 
combined code on corporate governance, which also promotes certainty in corporate disclosure and governance. 
Mallin (2002: 253) stated that “corporate governance codes and their recommendations undoubtedly contribute 
towards increased transparency and disclosure”. Previous studies by Solomon et al. (2000) and Solomon and 
Solomon (2004) have also contributed to the relationship between corporate governance and risk disclosure. 
In concordance with various theoretical debates (i.e. agency theory regards corporate governance as a control 
mechanism), the literature has generally reported a link between reporting and corporate governance (Ho and Wang, 
2001; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). For instance, the impact of corporate governance attributes on disclosure 
exercises has proven to diminish information asymmetries and enhance the functionality of organisational 
stewardship. Furthermore, the precision of risk information is used as an external control mechanism, which lessens 
agency costs and is of great importance to all interested groups (investors and analysts). This provides all interested 
groups with the functionality to formulate precise investment decisions and evaluate institutions’ risk profiles 
effectively (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015; Campbell et al., 2014; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Miihkinen, 2013). 
The theoretical association between corporate governance and disclosure has mainly been examined through 
information asymmetry (signalling theory) and agency theory. In the case of future disclosure examinations, the 
literature has proposed the employment of agency and signalling theories to examine the links between disclosure 
and managerial incentives (Core, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010). Moreover, corporate governance mechanisms have been 
recognised as controlling agency problems and guaranteeing that directors’ actions are in the best interest of 
shareholders (Ho and Wong, 2001). 
Agency theory explains the disagreements between directors and shareholders when directors’ interests differ 
from those of shareholders. However, it has been established by a number of prior investigations that various 
monitoring mechanisms, such as audit committees, independent external auditing and well-timed financial reviews 
(Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Spira and Page, 2003) are able to mitigate agency problems since they provide top 
management with more reliable information for financial reporting purposes. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue 
that monitoring plays a central part in controlling the conduct of directors. Healy and Palepu (2001) proposed four 
resolutions for agency problems, the second of which includes corporate governance, with an emphasis on the board 
of directors’ responsibility to monitor and discipline management in the best interest of outside owners. 
Information asymmetry conflicts (also underpinned by signalling theory) between internal directors and 
external investors could extend to internal control systems in the case of corporate governance (Akerlof, 1970; 
Spence, 1973). Accordingly, outsiders cannot observe internal control activity and conduct in some circumstances 
due to the lack of regulations and guidance on internal control activity and conduct. Therefore, shareholders tend 
not to have a full understanding of the nature and scope of internal control systems. This leads to shareholders 
having difficulty appreciating managers’ efforts to counter risks. Yet, managers could reduce information 
asymmetries by using their discretion to provide more information on internal control and risk management, 
potentially benefitting analysts, investors and other market users (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Deumes and Knechel, 
2008). 
It has been noticed from prior literature that agency theory and information asymmetry, both of which 
underpin signalling theory, are deployed to explicate risk disclosure to investors (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Lopes 
and Rodrigues, 2007; Vandemaele et al., 2009; Elshandidy et al., 2013). When internal management decides to 
disclose risk information to decrease agency conflicts, this culminates in mitigating information asymmetries 
between both parties. However, internal management might sometimes choose to release some risk information to 
 
 signal their competence and capability to handle risks to distinguish themselves from the rest, which might translate 
into an improved reputation and some monetary gain. In addition to formulating this paper’s hypotheses, the 
following section discusses a number of corporate governance attributes and their potential impact on risk disclosure 
practices. 
Corporate governance studies investigate the relationship between corporate governance attributes and 
corporate performance. This investigation concentrates on the impact of corporate governance attributes on risk 
disclosure. Whilst a number of studies have looked into the effect of corporate governance on disclosure in 
developed countries, the impact of corporate governance on risk disclosure in developing markets has received scant 
attention. Thereafter, this research will try to address this gap and contribute to the literature by examining the effect 
of corporate governance attributes on risk disclosure practices in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The Upper Echelons Theory 
 
In pioneering work by Hambrick and Mason   (1984), the two concepts of the dominant coalition and demographic 
research were combined. The authors suggested that certain organizational effects are linked to top management 
teams having specific demographic profiles. Moreover, upper echelons theory proposes that the characteristics of 
top management, in particular demographic characteristics, might affect strategic decision- makings and hence 
performance. At the centre of this   theory   is   the   notion   that   the background knowledge and values of 
corporate directors impact upon the essential strategic decisions made by these central corporate managers. 
Hambrick and Mason also claimed that observable attributes, e.g. age, practical experience and tenure, could 
function as practical proxies for the cognitive base that directs top directors’ decisions. Moreover, upper echelons 
theory is categorized according to several important elements. As highlighted by Hambrick and Mason (1984), 
demographic features influence strategic decision making and performance. Thus, in this study the concept is 
extended to the determinants of risk disclosure, investigating whether such features of the top board could impact 
upon the determinants of risk reportage in the banking sector. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Upper echelons model 
Above is the adapted upper echelons framework, which is based on three fundamental principles: first, the 
strategic choices taken by institutions (the representations of the cognitive bases and values of the dominant 
players, the top board members); second, the cognitive bases and values of such players (the ramifications of their 
observable characteristics, such as functional trucks and education); and third, significant institutional consequences 
that are related to the observable characteristics of such players. In fact, this theory proposes that institutional 
performance is only a representation of its top board directors. However, the fourth dimension (disclosure) added 
to the above framework can be directly influenced by upper echelons theory characteristics or indirectly by the 
ramifications of the overall performance of the company, where sometimes risk disclosure would mean survival 
for an institution. This model also plays a vital part in determining key institutional effects, such as the provision of 
risk disclosure. It also grants us the opportunity to investigate the core determinants of board demography in relation 
to risk disclosure. 
This theory implies that certain organizational effects are linked to top management teams having specific 
demographic   profiles.   Moreover,   upper echelons theory proposes that the characteristics of top management, in 
particular demographic characteristics, might affect strategic decision- makings and hence performance. At the 
 
 centre of this theory is the notion that the background knowledge and values of corporate directors impact upon the 
essential strategic decisions made by these central corporate managers. Moreover, this theory incorporates several 
important elements such as the demographic features, strategic decision making and performance. Thus, in this study 
the concept is extended to the determinants of risk disclosure, investigating whether such features of the top board 
could impact upon the determinants of risk reportage in the banking sector. Such demographic traits play an 
important role in determining key institutional effects, such as the provision of risk disclosure in the annual reports. 
This theory will also assist this investigation in interpreting the findings of the current study’s second question to 
identify what determines risk information in the annual reports. This theory will also be employed for reinforcing 
the results to the second research question. It also grants this study the opportunity to investigate the core 
determinants of board demography in relation to risk disclosure. 
This theory has only been used in fields other than disclosure. For example, Peterson et al. (2003) deployed 
upper echelons theory when examining the determinants of organisational performance, while Tihanyi et al.  (2000) 
used it when exploring   the effects of firm international diversification and Mutuku et al. (2008) employed it when 
studying the quality of decisions and performance. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no prior research has 
investigated disclosure in relation to upper echelons theory. Hence, this is the first study to extend the employment 
of upper echelons theory into the area of disclosure. 
 
4.LITERATURE 
 
While many studies have  examined  the individual characteristics of corporate governance, such as ownership 
structure and independent outside directors (Mohobbot, 2005; Konishi and Ali, 2007; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; 
Hill and Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010), only a few have explored corporate governance 
characteristics in developed countries (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011b; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012), Apart from Mousa and Elamir (2013), Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) and Abdullah, Hassan and 
McClelland (2015), who examined a single attribute of corporate governance characteristics, percentage of foreign 
ownership, duality and board size, the literature on developing economies has not explored comprehensively 
corporate governance characteristics (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2009; Abdullah and Hassan, 2013; 
Al-Shammeri, 2014). Furthermore, not a single study has examined corporate governance as a determinant of risk 
disclosure in the Saudi context in particular. Therefore, this is the first study that focuses on the Saudi market in 
that domain. In addition, the current study is the only one that explores corporate governance characteristics and 
risk disclosure in the GCC market since the previous literature focused on firm- specific characteristics. 
Furthermore, whilst a small number of studies have examined risk disclosure over more than a one year 
period in developed economies (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Deumes, 2008; Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Rajab and 
Schachler, 2009; Hill and Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010; Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey, 2015), 
none have examined risk disclosure over more than a one year period in developing economies (Amran, Bin and 
Hassan, 2009;  Hassan,  2009;  Abdullah  and  Hassan,  2013; 
Mousa and Elmir, 2013; Al-Shammeri, 2014; Abdullah, Hassan and McClelland, 2015). Therefore, the current 
study is the only study that examines risk disclosure over a period of five years in developing economies. 
While nonfinancial and mixed institutions in developed countries have been widely researched and reported 
upon in the literature (Carlon, Loftus and Miller, 2003; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; 
Lajili and Zeghal, 2005; Combes- Thuelin, Henneron and Touron, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Deumes and 
Knechel, 2008; Hill and Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower and Neilson, 2010; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011b; 
Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal, 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey, 2015), only a 
few studies have focused on financial institutions in developed countries (Solomon, Solomon and Norton, 2000; 
Linsley, Shrives and Crumpton, 2006; Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011a; Maffei et al., 2014)  and no 
investigations have been conducted on financial institutions in developing markets (Amran, Bin and Hassan, 2009; 
Hassan, 2009; Abdullah and Hassan, 2013; Mousa and Elmir 2013; Al-Shammeri, 2014; Abdullah, Hassan and 
McClelland, 2015). Therefore, this is the only study that investigates financial institutions in developing economies, 
particularly Saudi Arabia. Also none of the above studies have examined the demographic attributes of top 
management teams nor have they employed upper echelons theory in examining the nature and determinates of risk 
disclosure. Therefore, this is the only study that examines the demographic traits of the top boards in developing 
countries. This is a response to the call for more research into the relationship between the demographic 
characteristics and risk disclosure made by Abdullah, Hassan and McClelland (2015). Based on the developing and 
appropriate preceding literature on disclosure and risk disclosure in relation to corporate governance, a number of 
corporate governance attributes will be presented along with their potential impact on risk disclosure practices. This 
paper’s hypotheses will thus be formulated. 
 
5.HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
5.1.Ownership Structure 
 
Corporate governance and financial reporting have been markedly affected by ownership structure and corporate 
 
 culture (Beattie et al., 2001). It has been argued that ownership and governance (which constitute the board of 
directors) could affect companies’ risk reporting since the directors compose the yearly reports for shareholders 
(Abraham and Cox, 2007). Moreover, when reviewing the literature for the purpose of conducting this investigation, 
it was noticed that a variety of proxies have been applied to the ownership structure variable. 
These are: ownership concentration; institutional ownership; the number of shareholders; government ownership; 
the proportion of shares owned by outsiders; family ownership; managerial ownership; the percentage of closely 
held shares (CHS); foreign ownership and the NOSH-Factor, which combines the free-float shares; the percentage 
of total share available to the ordinary investor; total strategic holdings; and investment-company held shares. 
However, empirical research has discovered a mixture of outcomes in this regard, which might be explained by the 
dissimilarity between the employment measurement and the ownership factor.  
As a consequence, Fama and Jensen (1983) stated that modern establishments are distinguished by the 
detachment of ownership from control i.e. detaching management decisions from monitoring decisions. 
Additionally,   Cooke   (1989b,    p.177) stated, “Where there is a divorce of ownership from control, the potential 
for agency costs exists because of conflict between, firstly, shareholders and managers and, secondly,
 bondholders  and shareholder-managers”.Owusu-Ansah (1998) confirmed that ownership structure and 
disclosure connection is explained by agency theory since modern   corporations   are   distinguished   by    the 
detachment of ownership from control. 
On the one hand, corporations with dispersed public ownership of securities will be inclined to have high 
agency costs, whereby stockholders can pressurize management for more information as part of the monitoring 
activity. On the other hand, in the event of concentrated ownership, there is little or no physical segregation between 
owners and managers of the capital and most of the risk related information can be exchanged at boardroom 
meetings or in a casual manner. Hence, less risk related information will be accessible to the public (Mohobbot, 
2005). 
Furthermore, information asymmetry can also be related to the discussion on the effect of ownership 
structure on financial reporting. Concentrated ownership companies may not encounter a high level of information 
asymmetry via augmented exposure, and these companies are not as easily able to comply with public reportage 
since most of the information is communicated at meetings and other informal manners (Mohobbot, 2005). What’s 
more, Owusu-Ansah (1998) claimed that when there is extensively distributed ownership, individual shareholders 
are not in a strong position to influence company disclosure policies and practices owing to not having the power 
to access the firm’s internal information. Conversely, Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994) posit that discretionary 
reporting tends to be more common in extensively held companies in order for directors to efficiently oversee 
managers so as to optimize the firm’s financial interests and ensure that they are operating in the best interests of 
the owners. Nevertheless, Kothari (2000) stated that the ownership distribution pattern and dispersed managerial 
ownership foster the demand for reporting to be high. However, Mohobbot (2005) argued that in the case of 
concentrated ownership concentration, most of the risk related information could be exchanged at the boardroom 
meeting or by any other casual manner, which will result in less risk related information being available to the 
market. Thus, there may be a negative relationship between risk disclosure and the number of shareholders. What’s 
more, Wallace and Nasser (1995) argued that the more people who demand to know about the activities of a 
company, the more comprehensive the reporting of the company. The authors also proposed that the boost in risk 
reporting could solve supervising difficulties related to growth in the proportion of the company owned by outsiders. 
Konishi and Ali (2007) established that there was an insignificant correlation between the ownership diffusion 
pattern and the number of risk disclosures. However, the researchers still felt that there was an association between 
the two variables. They explained that managers could hold a high proportion of stocks and choose not to report 
all risk related information. Konishi and Ali (2007) confirmed that risk reporting policy is controlled by the board 
of directors or the top management team, implying that there can be no risk disclosure without their involvement. In 
addition, Deumes and Knechel (2008) discovered a negative relationship between internal control disclosures and 
both ownership concentration and managerial ownership. The authors suggested that this could indicate that there 
are monetary reasons why corporate managers voluntarily disclose more/less information on internal    control    and   
that   corporate   managers evaluate the disclosure’s costs and advantages then only disclose if the advantages 
outweigh the costs. 
In spite of this, The Office of Fair Trading (2009) argued that government ownership can influence markets 
through immediate participation, for example, as market makers or as suppliers and buyers of goods and services 
or by indirect participation in private markets via taxation, regulations and subsidies. Moreover, Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) claimed that government ownership could lead to unusual access to corporations’ information so as to 
monitor their investment actions, making them less motivated to increase public disclosure. 
Konishi and Ali (2007) acknowledged that the aim of those corporations’ disclosure strategies is to respond to 
the disparities in the demand for public exposure encountered. They also argued that where the government owns 
the majority of shares, risk reportage would be lower than when ownership is dispersed. This is due to the increased 
pressure on corporate managers to report more risk related information. However, Cooke (1998) documented an 
insignificant relationship between government ownership and disclosure. 
Nonetheless, Mohobbot (2005) contended that if the number of foreign investors is high, there is more 
pressure on corporate managers to report higher numbers of risk related disclosures. Furthermore, Mangena and 
 
 Tauringana (2007) reported a positive relationship between disclosure and foreign holdings, whereas Konishi and 
Ali (2007) documented an insignificant relationship between the two variables. 
In the case of institutional holdings, Hassan (2008) affirmed that company directors respond to demands from 
institutional environments by adjusting some practices, such as the reportage of risk related information, so as to 
acquire social legitimacy. Additionally, Taylor (2011) stated that institutional stockholders are expected to reduce 
asymmetrical information by performing an overseeing role due to close contacts with the management of 
organizations as well as preventing management from withdrawing risk information. However, Solomon, Solomon 
and Norton (2000) reported that institutional stockholders in the UK acknowledged that expanded corporate risk 
disclosure would aid their portfolio investment decision-making, yet they did not support a regulated setting for 
risk disclosure or any general statement on business risk. Furthermore, Abraham and Cox (2007) discovered that 
there was a negative relationship between risk disclosure and long-term institutional investors in the UK, whereas 
they found a positive correlation with short-term investors. However, Taylor (2011) reported that there was no 
significant association between long-term institutional shareholders and disclosure in Australia. He also discovered 
a positive correlation between short-term institutional shareholders and risk reportage. 
Elshandidy et al. (2013) documented a positive significant correlation between ownership structure (proxied 
by CHS and NOSH-Factor) and risk disclosure. In addition, some empirical research results have revealed that 
institutions with lower insider ownership (proxied by CHS) are prone to higher risk disclosure (Elshandidy et al., 
2013; Marshall and Weetman, 2007; Gelb, 2000).    Also, institutions with higher outsider ownership (proxied by 
NOSH-Factor) are prone to considerably higher levels of risk disclosure (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Deumes and 
Knechel, 2008; Abraham and Cox, 2007). Therefore, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between risk disclosure and insider ownership. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and outsider ownership. 
 
5.2.Board Size 
 
To date, there have been few specific   investigations into the relationship between board size and risk disclosure. 
However, a number of researchers have examined board size in the context of voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) claimed that there is no consensus regarding a connection between the level of 
voluntary exposure and board size and that it remains an empirical issue. The same could be said for the relationship 
between board size and risk disclosure. Moreover, Chen and Jaggi (2000) argued that a large number of directors on 
the board could lessen the information asymmetry issue and instigate more disclosure. Also, Healy and Palepu 
(2001) confirmed that the number of directors on the board could affect its control and monitoring operations, 
though disclosure is regarded as a monitoring item that could be increased. 
Conversely, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) agreed that the more directors on the board the less efficient it would 
be at monitoring management. According to agency theory, bigger boards are bad and corrupt, while smaller boards 
are good and effective in terms of enhancing performance and disclosure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Free rider 
problems between executives, expanded decision making time, raised costs, poor communication and monitoring 
could all have an adverse effect on disclosure levels and good practice (Jensen, 1993). However, several recent 
studies have associated large boards with greater risk disclosure (Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Ntim et al., 2013; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015) 
All in all, the empirical findings on this issue have been mixed. Ntim et al. (2013), Elshandidy et al. (2013), 
Allegrini and Greco (2013) and Elshandidy and Neri (2015) all found a positive relationship between the number 
of directors on the board and risk disclosure. In addition, Abeysekera (2010) discovered that there was a positive 
connection between discourse and board size in Kenya. However, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) established that 
there was no significant association between the two variables, while Jia et al. (2009) Guest (2009) and Coles et al. 
(2008) documented a negative relationship between board size and disclosure and performance. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis was formulated: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and board size. 
 
5.3.Independent Directors 
 
It has been claimed by agency theorists that the board of directors acts as a shield and plays a substantial part in 
corporate governance in terms of decision control and the monitoring of operations (Cheng et al., 2006). However, 
Ho and Wong (2001) contented that agency theory does not assume that all groups on the board of directors enhance 
accountability and extend disclosure. There is a mixture of corporate insiders and outsiders on the board, all of 
whom may have distinctive views on disclosure. The outsiders (independent directors) act as a measure of 
corporate governance quality and are more likely to minimize agency problems and lower the demand for 
regulatory intervention in corporate disclosure (Abraham and Cox, 2007). Accordingly, Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) 
claimed that more independent directors are required on boards of directors to control and monitor the operations 
of managers and that this leads to more disclosure from corporations. 
However, the empirical findings on independent directors and risk disclosure are diverse. Abraham and Cox 
(2007) and Elshandidy et al. (2013) confirmed that there was a positive correlation between independent directors 
 
 and risk disclosure, whereas Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) found no significant relationship between risk disclosure 
and independent directors. Therefore, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and independent directors. 
 
5.4.Non-executive Directors 
 
The empirical findings on the influence of   non-executive directors on disclosure practices have been mixed. Fama 
and Jensen (1983) claimed that the existence of non-executive directors on the board could result in the reduction 
of agency conflicts among owners and managers. Moreover, Barako et al. (2006) argued that non-executive directors 
are regarded by investors and stockholders as a fundamental control and monitoring element of corporate 
governance, delivering the indispensable checks and balances required to improve board effectiveness. Also, Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) affirmed that non-executive directors are considered to be the control, check and balance 
mechanism that increases board effectiveness. However, Ho and Wong (2001) contented that agency theory does 
not assume that all groups on the board of directors enhance accountability and extend disclosure. 
In opposition, Abraham and Cox (2007) claimed that an increased number of non-executive directors on the 
board makes it more likely that stockholders’ preferences on accountability and transparency are met. Furthermore, 
the authors argued that the findings illustrated that the combination of boards plays a substantial part in the 
transmission of risk related disclosures to shareholders and different groups of directors. As a result, more 
reportage is predicted if the non-executive directors are in fact performing their monitoring job rather than their 
perceived-monitoring job, putting pressure on management to release more information (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Eng and Mac, 2003). 
Berry (2008) confirmed that in his roles as a non-executive director of a number of UK corporations he had 
endeavored to contribute to the expansion of efficient risk management as well as attempting to clarify the key risks 
to the board. He also argued that not all non-executive directors   are independent and that dependent non-executive 
directors could have contacts with management which would call to question their role in monitoring, controlling 
and increasing disclosure levels. 
Empirical investigations by Abraham and Cox (2007) and Deumes and Knechel (2008) found that there was 
no significant relationship between non- executive directors and risk disclosure, whereas, Eng and Mac (2003) and 
Elshandidy et al. (2013) reported a positive relationship between non-executive directors and risk disclosure. Based 
on this discussion the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and non-executive directors. 
 
5.5.Audit Committee Independence 
 
It   has   been   argued   that   limited   research   has attempted to examine the link between disclosure and the 
features of audit committees (Albitar, 2015). As a part of the internal control system and corporate governance, 
corporations assign audit committees. Audit committee members have to work on behalf of the board of directors 
and for the benefit of investors. Moreover, Barako et al. (2006) explained that the audit committee can play a 
supervisory role, which would lead to an enhanced quality of information flowing between stockholders and 
directors, particularly in the event of financial reporting wherein the two parties hold unequal levels of information. 
Similarly, Forker (1992) stated that an audit committee can act as an efficient monitoring mechanism that minimizes 
agency costs and augments disclosure. In addition, Ho and Wong (2001) claimed that because audit committees 
contain predominantly non-executive managers, they have the power to moderate the amount of information 
withheld. Audit committees play possibly important part to in ensuring sound corporate governance (Avison and 
Cowton, 2012) 
Furthermore, Taylor (2011) argued that the agency theory argument suggests that the more independent the 
audit committee is from upper administration, the more probable it is to act in the best interests of the firm’s investors 
in terms of decreasing information asymmetry. The researcher also acknowledged that audit committees have two 
main responsibilities, firstly, to make sure that risks are coped with and internal controls exist to protect against 
risks and secondly, to ensure that corporate statements are examined to guarantee the integrity of financial and other 
investor related disclosures for shareholders. 
Nevertheless, the empirical findings on disclosure and audit committee independence have been mixed. Taylor 
(2011) and Oliveira et al. (2011b) reported a positive association between audit committee independence and risk 
disclosure. However, they also reported an insignificant association between risk disclosure and the financial 
expertise of audit committee members. Furthermore, Neri (2010) found an insignificant relationship between these 
two variables. Therefore, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H6: There is a positive relationship between risk disclosure and the independence of audit committee. 
 
5.6.Audit committee size 
 
As previously stated, a part of the internal control system and corporate governance corporations assign audit 
committees. This concept was first proposed and examined by Forker (1992). He stated that an audit committee can 
 
 act as an efficient monitoring mechanism that can minimize agency costs and augment disclosure. Moreover, Ho 
and Wong (2001) claimed that the presence of an audit committee significantly affects the extent of disclosure. 
Also, the authors claimed that because audit committees contain predominantly non- executive managers, they have 
the power to moderate the amount of information withheld. Moreover, Chen and Jaggi (2000) argued that a large 
number of directors on the committee could lessen the information asymmetry issue and lead to more disclosure. 
Prior empirical research has indicated a positive relationship between disclosure and audit committee size (Barako 
et al., 2006). Therefore, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and risk disclosure 
 
5.7.Audit committee meetings 
 
Previous literature has offered pragmatic evidence on the advantages of directors meticulously controlling 
disclosure, with the number of meetings being a key aspect of this control (Alegrini and Greco, 2013). Karamanou 
and Valeas (2005) claimed that regular meetings have a fundamental impact on audit committee effectiveness. It 
has also been argued that regular audit committee meetings are more likely to lead to compliance with 
responsibilities and the monitoring of financial reporting (to improve the quality of information that flows between 
stockholders and directors, where the two parties hold unequal levels of information (Barako et al., 2006)). In 
addition, Chen et al. (2006) affirmed that meeting more regularly decreases the risk of fraud. Karamanou and Vafeas 
(2005) documented a positive relationship between the regularity of audit committee meetings and the probability 
of making earnings forecasts, thus leading to greater disclosure. Also, Allegrini and Greco (2013) reported a positive 
link between the regularity of audit committee meetings and disclosure. Therefore, the following hypothesis was 
formulated: 
H8: There is a positive correlation between the number of meetings of the audit committee and risk 
disclosure. 
 
5.8.Demographic Variables 
 
There have been a number of examinations of     the relationship between the attributes of top organizational 
managers and various organizational effects (Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Bantel, 1993; Walt and Ingley, 2003; 
Kang et al., 2007; Mutuku et al., 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Two essential theoretical advances in the area 
of organizational research are key. Firstly, Cyert and March (1963) developed the concept of the dominant coalition, 
which shifts the focus from the individual CEO to the whole team of the board of directors in terms of organizational 
leadership. The second concept is the increased emphasis on utilizing observable demographic characteristics, such 
as age, gender, tenure and experience in organizational studies and investigating the link between these attributes 
and organizational consequences (Pfeffer, 1983; Tehanyi et al., 2000; Mutuku et al., 2008) 
In groundbreaking work by Hambrick and Mason (1984), these two concepts, namely the dominant coalition 
and demographic research, were combined. The authors suggested that certain organizational effects are linked to 
top management teams having specific demographic profiles. Moreover, upper echelon theory proposes that top 
management characteristics, in particular their demographic characteristics, could impair strategic decision making. 
At the centre of this theory is the idea that background knowledge and the values of corporate directors impact upon 
essential strategic decisions made and acted upon by these central corporate managers. Hambrick and Mason also 
claimed that observable attributes, for example, age, practical experience and tenure, could function as practical 
proxies for the cognitive base that guides top directors’ decisions.  
However, a number of academic researchers have criticized the demographic approach (Pettigrew, 1992; 
Lawrence, 1997; Aldrich, 1979). Therefore, the main concern is the necessity to access the “black box” that might 
contain the operative mechanism connecting demographic characteristics to organizational aftermath consequences 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Pettigrew (1992: 178) claimed that little is known about “the processes by which 
top teams go about their tasks”. Lawrence (1997) illustrated that demographic variables are sometimes employed 
as representatives for subjective concepts. The author noticed that investigators depending on the demographic 
approach make a congruence assumption via which demographic variables are employed to represent subjective 
concepts without offering a logical justification for why this is a valid approach. 
Yet, studies investigating team demography and processes have offered important insights into the reported 
“black box”. For instance, Smith et al. (1994), Tehanyi et al. (2000) and Mutuku et al. (2008) reported that top 
management team demography was indirectly associated with performance via intervening process variables 
incorporating social integration and communication. Meanwhile, Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin (1999), Walt and Ingley 
(2003), Kang et al. (2007) and Adams and Ferreira (2009) reported that team demography diversity can lead to 
disagreement, which can affect group performance, which in turn affects all aspects of organizational decision-
making and outcomes. In addition, some of these investigators found that these associations were further controlled 
by task routines and group longevity. 
Limitations are inherent in any approach. However, a strand of literature that depends predominantly on top 
management team demographic variables has produced important findings. These investigations mostly 
concentrated on two dimensions of team composition.  Firstly, they focused on the impact of demographic attributes 
 
 on the consequences of organizational decisions based  upon  the  notion  that    particulardemographic attributes 
are connected with top management perceptions, which eventually lead to certain actions and consequences. Some 
of these investigations recognized a significant link between top management team demographic traits and corporate 
strategies (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Bantel, 1993; Mutuku et al., 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Nielsen and 
Huse, 2010; Ellwood and Gracia-Lacalle, 2015; Allini et al., 2015). 
All in all, the dependence on the demographic approach still appears to be justified (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1996). Lawrence (1997) also demonstrated that demographic variables have important qualities, offering high 
content validity and replicability in a domain where replication is all too rare. In addition, Pfeffer (1983) 
recommended the employment of observable managerial traits as a means of addressing the shortcomings of 
subjective studies, which sometimes incorporate measurement error, differences in conceptualizations and low 
levels of explained variance. This is also reflected in Finkelstein and Hambrick’s (1996: 47) work, which 
demonstrated that, “an executive’s tenure in the firm is open to essentially no measurement error”. Furthermore, the 
authors responded to the limitations of the dependence on psychological as matched to demographic variables. 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996: 46) also noted that demographic traits are more easily obtainable by investigators 
since top directors are normally reluctant to “submit to batteries of psychological tests”. 
The decision that institutions make to disclose risk related information necessitates careful assessment and 
consideration of a huge collection of complicate organizational issues. However, extending the demographic 
approach into the field of banks’ risk disclosure practices could lead to better understanding of the role of top 
management teams and their decisions in relation to risk disclosure at their banks. In the following section, the 
demographic characteristics are explored and hypotheses are developed. 
 
5.9.Gender 
 
The presence of woman on the board of publicly listed institutions is becoming of interest to researchers (Ellwood 
and Gracia-Lacalle, 2015). However, one could argue from an agency theory viewpoint that gender does not 
influence the effectiveness of the board of a firm. However, upper echelons theory argues that top management 
demographic characteristics, such as gender, could influence strategic decision-making. Hence, gender differences 
might indicate variations in behaviour and skills between board members (Allini et al., 2015). Moreover, prior 
studies have generally revealed a mixture of results regarding women directors. Adams and Ferreira (2009) and 
Nielsen and Huse (2010) reported that women on top management teams influence decisions positively, while 
Bianco et al. (2011) strongly question their capacity to impact upon or add extra value to the team. In contrast, 
evidence from previous risk disclosure studies falls into two strands of literature. The first strand found that there 
is a positive correlation between gender and risk disclosure (Ntim et al., 2013; Allini et al., 2015), whereas   the 
second   strand   reported   a negative relationship between the two variables (Allini et al., 2014). Therefore, the 
following hypothesis was formulated: 
H9: There is a positive relationship between gender and risk disclosure 
 
5.10.Tenure 
 
Tenure is a significant factor in group procedure within a top management group. On the one hand, augmented 
tenure is related to decreased disagreement, permanence and better communication (Kats, 1982). It has also been 
argued that more tenure time on the board could be linked with shared cognitive structures and social cohesion 
(Michel and Hambrick, 1992). On the other hand, it has been argued that top board tenure could have negative 
outcomes (Keck, 1997) since directors working together for extensive periods of time could be inclined to develop 
similar views owing to the long-term acculturation of top team associates, which then results in a shared common 
perspective and corporate paradigm (Pfeffer, 1983). Such effects might result in dysfunctional decision-making, 
generating combined defensive avoidance (Keck, 1997; Janis and Mann, 1977). However, due to the ambiguous and 
difficult nature of risk disclosure decisions, a common understanding of the nature of risk disclosure could be 
fundamental. Therefore, members of the top management team with extended tenure could cultivate a more precise 
shared cognitive structure regarding the nature of risk disclosure decisions. Furthermore, extended tenure enables 
board members to better evaluate the surrounding environment of banks’ risk disclosure. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis was formulated: 
H10: There is a positive relationship between tenure of the board and risk disclosure. 
 
5.11.Education 
 
Prior   literature   has   indicated   that educational background affects strategic decision making procedures 
and outcomes (Hitt and Tyler, 1991). Moreover, it ensures better monitoring and the effectiveness of top 
management boards in light of agency theory (Allini at al., 2015). Also, it is an important determinant in the 
disclosure exercise (Farook et al., 2011; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Therefore, Hambrick and Mason (1984) claimed 
that executives with superior educational qualifications are better able to embrace new and innovative actions as 
well as uncertainty. Moreover, educational qualifications could be perceived as an important institutional asset, 
 
 i=1 
which may influence accounting values and exercises (Gray, 1988). Top executives with a strong educational 
background tend to have superior technical knowledge and a more open- minded attitude to risk disclosure decisions, 
which could lead to the reduction of information asymmetry (Domhoff, 1983). However, Guner et al. (2008) stated 
that there is a dearth of empirical studies on the association between board effectiveness and educational 
background. Only a few studies have examined this relationship empirically and revealed the same results. Gul and 
Leung (2002) and Allini et al. (2015) reported a negative association between educational background   and   risk 
disclosure.   Therefore, the following hypothesis has been formulated: 
H11: There is a negative association between educational background of the board and the risk disclosure. 
 
5.12.Diversity 
 
Top management team diversity is referred to as the heterogeneity of top executive teams regarding age, gender, 
tenure, educational background, nationality, ethnicity and functional background (Williams and O’Reilly, 1998; 
Simons et al., 1999; Walt and Ingley, 2003; Carter et al., 2003; Kang et al., 2007; Allini et al., 2015). Moreover, 
Shaw and Barrett-Power (1998) affirmed that diversity is a progressively significant element in institutions, which 
are becoming more diverse in respect of age, nationality, background, gender, ethnicity and other demographic traits. 
It has also been determined that when disentangling complex, non-routine issues, diverse groups are more efficient 
as they include a collection of personalities with different proficiencies, experience, capabilities and viewpoints. It 
has also been illustrated that boards with diverse membership with different abilities make more novel and higher 
quality decisions than boards with less diverse membership (Bantel and Jackson, 1989). The literature shows that 
numerous variables influence the association between diversity and board decision-making (in the case of this study, 
this could be the decision to disclose or withhold any risk information disclosures). Furthermore, risk disclosure 
studies have found that diversity significantly influences risk disclosure (Allini et al., 2015). Based on the above 
discussion, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H12: There is a positive association between diversity of the top management team and the degree of risk 
disclosure 
 
5.13.Control variables 
 
Control variables are incorporated in this study     to reduce the influence of the above-stated determinants. This 
study incorporates as control variables two firm-specific variables, size and profitability, in line with prior literature 
(Elshandidy et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Khlif and Hussainey, 2014; Allini et al., 2015; Elshandidy and Neri, 
2015). 
 
6.METHODOLOGY 
 
This section describes the research design of this investigation, including sample, data collection and techniques 
used to accomplish the aims of this research. 
 
6.1.Sample and Data Collection 
 
The sample consists of the annual reports of all Saudi listed banks over a five-year period. Following prior literature 
on the subject (Lipunga, 2014; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013), this paper excluded all non-financial corporations. 
Financial institutions are by nature risk-oriented institutions unlike non- financial corporations, and therefore their 
disclosure ought to be considered independently (Linsely and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Barakat and Hussainey,    2013). 
According to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, there are 12 listed banks on the Saudi exchange market today. 
Unlisted banks in Saudi Arabia are excluded. Therefore, the researcher can state that a total of 12 listed banks are 
included in this study. All the annual reports of the selected sample were collected from the banks’ homepages, 
with some of the variables being collected from DataStream and Bloomberg. This study covers a five-year period, 
during which the determinants of risk disclosure in the annual reports of listed banks in Saudi Arabia are examined. 
The selected annual reports cover the period from 2009 to 2013. 
Annual reports are used in this investigation because of their wide coverage and availability. This study’s 
focus on annual reports is due to their being the main source of information for shareholders as well as their growing 
use in statements, showing their value to user groups (Elshandidy et al., 2013; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; 
Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). This is concurrent with Marston and Shrives (1991), who described them as the “main 
disclosure vehicle” and argued that annual reports are the most complete financial statements accessible to investors. 
Moreover, Beattie et al. (2002) affirmed that annual reports provide comprehensive narratives,    information    as 
well    as explaining accounting figures, sketches and presents perspectives.  Also they corroborate quantitative 
measures   incorporated   in   the   financial   reports (Chugnh and Meador, 1984). 
 
 
  
6.2.Content Analysis Approach 
 
Content analysis has been widely used in   social accounting research (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Milne and Adler, 
1999; Parker, 2005; Kamla, 2007). These studies analyze the information content disclosed in annual reports and 
acknowledge words and themes within the textual material (Beattie et al., 2004; Brennan, 2001). When analysing 
the content of a written document, words, phrases and sentences are coded against a specific schema of interest 
(Bowman, 1984). Krippendorff (1980: 21) described content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable 
and valid inferences from data”. Furthermore, Bowman (1984) claimed that content analysis enables the collection 
of rich data since it can reveal relationships that other techniques cannot. However, a weakness of content analysis 
is that it is subjective (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Therefore, validation practices are often used to override this 
problem (Bowman, 1984). 
 
6.3.Risk Disclosure Index Development 
 
For  the  purpose  of  this  study,  a  risk   disclosure index, which is a checklist of different disclosure items included 
in banks’ annual reports, was developed (Arvidsson, 2003). During its construction, an extensive review of prior 
investigations was carried out. For an item to be included, it must have been used in previous published studies. 
The risk disclosure index was developed solely for the purpose of measuring the amount of risk disclosure in Saudi 
listed banks. The index included a total of 54 items that the researcher expected to be published in the annual 
reports of the sample banks. These 54 items fell into 8 categories: accounting policies, financial and other risks, 
derivative hedging and general risk information, financial instruments, reserves, segment information, business risk 
and compliance. Moreover, one of the important issues  during crafting the disclosure index was whether or not 
some items should be weighted more heavily (i.e. given more importance) than others. In accounting research, both 
weighted and un-weighted disclosure indices are utilized (Cooke, 1989; Marston and Shrives, 1991; Owusu-Ansah, 
1998). For the purpose of this paper, the un-weighted disclosure index was chosen because the study does not focus 
on a particular user group (Alsaeed, 2006; Naser et al., 2006). Instead the study addresses all users of annual 
reports and therefore there is no need to confer different importance levels to the disclosed risk items (Oliveira et 
al., 2006). The contents of each bank’s annual reports were compared with the items listed in the Appendix and, on 
the bases of a dichotomous model, they were coded as 1 if disclosed or 0 if otherwise. This index coincides with 
prior literature on disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Nazli and Ghazali, 2007; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Oliveira et al., 
2006). 
The total score for a bank is: 
 
TD = ∑n     di 
(1) 
Where d = 1 if the item is disclosed; 0 = if   the item is not disclosed; n = number of items. 
 
6.4.Reliability and Validity Measures 
 
Weber    (1988)    argued    that    the    classification procedure should be reliable and valid.  The reliability and 
validity of content analysis approaches need to be reviewed carefully. In human- scored schemes, reliability, that is 
the reproducibility of the measurement, is a major concern (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
The preceding studies argued that content analysis is not reliable if it is conducted only once or only by one specific 
person (Neuendorf, 2002). Consequently, to ensure the content validity of the initial research instrument, it was 
reviewed independently by two other researchers. Subsequently, after the researcher received the independent 
researcher’s comments and suggestions. A fourth experienced academic was required to discuss any ambiguities 
raised. The final disclosure checklist included 54 items. In terms of validity the research instrument (disclosure 
index) is valid if they can measure what they claim to measure (Field, 2009). In this study the index has measure 
what it claimed to measure; therefore the researcher can safely claim that the research instrument is valid. To ensure 
the reliability of the research instrument, the author and the two independent researchers scored three randomly 
selected banks. Then, the results from the three researchers were compared. Given that the final research disclosure 
index was agreed by all researchers, differences in the compliance scores from the researchers were insignificant. 
This method was adopted by Marston and Shrives (1991), who argued that the index scores awarded to firm could 
be considered reliable if other researchers could replicate the same results. 
 
6.5.Regression Model 
 
This study uses the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to examine the relationship between 
risk disclosure in the annual reports and both corporate governance mechanisms and demographic traits in 
Saudi listed banks:
 
 RISKD it= β0+β1CHS+β2 NOCH-FACTORS+β3 BSIZE+β4 
INDEP+β5 NON+β6 ACINDEP+β7 ACSIZE+β8 ACMEET+β9 EDUC+β10 TENU +β11 GENDER+ β12 
DIVERSITY β13 SIZE+ β14 PROF +ɛ (2) 
Where 
RISKD = risk disclosure score 
β0 = the intercept 
Β1….. β14 = regression coefficients (See table 1 for explanation) 
ɛ = error term 
I = Bank 
T = Year 
 
Dependent variable: risk disclosure score. Following prior studies (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012; Abdullah et al., 2015), content analysis was used to measure the level of risk disclosure in the 
annual reports. The number of risk-related words was used as a measure of risk disclosure levels. 
Independent variables: To examine the determinants of risk disclosure, corporate governance and demographic 
traits, information was collected from different sources. Table I summarizes the measurement and definition of those 
variables. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of variable names, description and sources 
 
Abbreviated name Full name Variable description Predicted Sign Data source 
Dependent variables 
RISKD Risk disclosure Risk disclosure level based on risk index Annual reports 
Independent variables 
1. Corporate Governance characteristics 
BSIZE Board size Number of board members + Annual report 
CHS Internal 
Ownership 
Percentage of shares held by internal 
shareholders 
- DataStream 
NOCH-Factor External 
Ownership 
Percentage of shares held by external 
shareholders 
+ DataStream 
INDEP Independent 
directors 
Number of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual Report 
NON Non-executive 
directors 
Dummy variable 1 if board contains non- 
executive directors and otherwise 0. 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual Report 
ACINDEP Audit committee 
independence 
Proportion of non-executive director on board. + Bloomberg 
Annual Report 
ACSIZE Audit committee 
size 
Number of audit committee members + Annual report 
ACMEET Audit committee 
meetings 
Number of audit committee meetings + Annual report 
2. Demographic characteristics 
EDUC Education Dummy variable 1 if one of the board members holds a 
PhD period and otherwise 0. 
+ Annual report 
TENU Tenure Dummy variable 1 if the number of years the board 
member permanence on the board is above the sample 
median of 5 years, otherwise 0. 
+ Annual report 
GENDER Gender Dummy variable 1 if board contains female 
directors and otherwise 0. 
+ Annual report 
DIVE Diversity Dummy variable 1 if board contains more than one 
nationality and otherwise 0. 
+ Annual report 
3. Firm-specific characteristics (Control Variables) 
SIZE Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets + DataStream 
PROF Profitability ROA (Return On Assets) + DataStream 
LEV Leverage Long-term debt/ total assets + DataStream 
LIQ Liquidity Current Ratio: Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities 
+ Annual report 
DIVID Dividend payout Dividends per share + DataStream 
This table provides the description and measures of risk disclosure reporting, as dependent variables, and firm characteristics, corporate governance 
mechanism and demographic traits as independent variables. It also provides the source of each variable. 
 
7.EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
7.1.Descriptive analysis 
 
Table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics for the corporate governance variables and the demographic traits used 
in the analysis of the sample banks in this investigation. It shows the minimum, maximum, statistical mean and 
the standard deviation.  Firstly, it shows that the mean total risk disclosure is 66.03%. It also shows that there is a 
large variation in risk reporting between the sampled banks, with a minimum of 51%  and  a maximum  of  78%.  It 
 
 also shows that the mean of CHS holdings is 19% and the mean of NOCH-Factor ownership is 29.5%, while the 
mean board size is 10 directors, with a mean of 7 members of the board in the sample banks consisting of non-
executive directors. Furthermore, the table shows that the independent directors mean is 5, with a minimum of 3 
and a maximum of 8 independent directors. Secondly, the audit committee (AC) independence mean is 75, whereas 
the audit committee size ranges from 2 to 5 directors, with a mean of 3. There is also a large variation in the 
number of AC meetings between the sample banks, with a minimum of 3 meetings, a maximum of 11 and a mean 
of 5. Finally, this table also shows the demographic traits of the top management teams included in the descriptive 
analysis, which are gender, tenure, education and diversity. It is also important to note that all of these variables have 
been treated as a dummy variable (1- 0). Where gender scored an overall mean of .08, tenure of the top board of 
directors scored a total mean of .6, while education scored a total mean of .7 and diversity scored a total mean of .3 
in the entire sample of this investigation. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
RISKD 60 .51 .78 .6603 .07059 
CHS 60 0.00 69.00 19.1000 17.46056 
NOCH-Factor 60 25.00 45.00 29.5000 5.08091 
BSIZE 60 7.00 11.00 9.5500 .94645 
INDEP 60 3.00 8.00 5.1333 1.62049 
NON 60 1 11 7.37 2.718 
ACINDEP 60 0.00 1.00 .7500 .43667 
ACSIZE 60 2.00 5.00 3.7667 .96316 
ACMEET 60 3.00 11.00 5.3667 1.95688 
GENDER 60 0.00 1.00 .0833 .27872 
TENU 60 0.00 1.00 .6000 .49403 
EDUC 60 0.00 1.00 .7000 .46212 
DIVE 60 0.00 1.00 .3333 .47538 
SIZE 60 7.24 8.58 7.9940 .35203 
PROF 60 -.01 .04 .0192 .00869 
Valid N (listwise) 60 
    
This table presents the descriptive analysis for the corporate governance variables and the demographic traits used in the regression model for the sample banks in 
this investigation. RISKD: Risk disclosure score (based on an unweighted disclosure index); CHS: Internal ownership (Percentage of shares held by internal 
shareholders); NOCH-Factor: External ownership (Percentage of shares held by all external shareholders); BSIZE: Board size (Number of board members); INDEP: 
Independent directors (Number of non-executive directors on the board of directors); NON: Non-executive directors (Dummy variable 1 if board contains non-
executive directors and otherwise 0); ACINDEP: Audit committee independence (Dummy variable; 1 if audit committee independence exists,  and  0 otherwise); 
ACSIZE: Audit committee size (Number of audit committee members); ACMEET: Audit committee meetings (Number of audit committee meetings); GENDER: 
Gender (Number of females on the board); TENU: Tenure (Dummy variable 1 if the number of years the board member permanence on the board is above the 
sample median of 5 years, otherwise 0); EDUC: Education (Number of board members holding a PhD); DIVE: Diversity (Number of other nationalities of the 
board ); SIZE: Bank size (Natural logarithm of total assets); PROF: Profitability (Return On Assets) 
 
7.2.Regression analysis 
 
The analysis of the risk disclosure of Saudi listed banks and their determinants led to some concrete results since 
six of the independent variables, namely Noch-Factors, board size, audit committee meetings, gender, size and 
profitability, are the main variables directing risk disclosure decisions in Saudi listed banks. The summary table 
below demonstrates that the R square and adjusted R square are high for the study under consideration, where both 
R square and adjusted R square are high at .706 and .576, respectively, supporting the explanatory power of the 
model. The Durbin-Watson test confirmed that there is no autocorrelation problem with the data. Moreover, the 
ANOVA table below indicates that the model is significant, with an F value of 5.458, confirming the fitness of the 
model used for the purpose of this study. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Pearson correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
RISKD 
 
CHS NOCH- Factor 
 
BSIZE 
 
INDEP 
 
NON 
 
ACINDEP 
 
ACSIZE 
 
ACMEET 
 
GENDER 
 
TENU 
 
EDUC 
 
DIVE 
 
SIZE 
 
ROA 
RISKD 1 
              
CHS -.129 1 
             
NOCH-Factor .411** -.492** 1 
            
BSIZE -.107 .364** .073 1 
           
INDEP -.171 .195 -.248 -.038 1 
          
NON -.095 .290* -.308* .467** .439** 1 
         
ACINDEP .074 -.190 .325* -.072 .335** .050 1         
ACSIZE .136 .243 -.062 .013 .335** .454** .141 1 
       
ACMEET .054 .196 .153 .566** .075 .459** -.089 .190 1 
      
GENDER .093 .061 -.215 .016 .050 .138 .174 -.242 -.212 1 
     
TENU -.356** .195 -.218 .007 .110 -.103 -.079 .121 .014 -.246 1 
    
EDUC -.241 -.059 -.173 -.081 .326* .251 .294* -.046 .030 .197 .134 1 
   
 
 DIVE .375** -.261* .547** .226 -.169 .114 .408** -.086 -.024 .426** -.433** .077 1 
  
SIZE .479** .006 .071 .101 -.478** -.052 -.225 .019 -.055 -.166 -.126 -.211 .112 1 
 
PROF .271* .329* -.227 .283* -.172 .200 -.279* .219 .158 -.181 .039 -.148 -.055 .529** 1 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the corporate governance variables and the demographic traits used in the regression model for the sample banks in this investigation. RISKD: Risk 
disclosure score (based on an un-weighted disclosure index, where equal weights were attached to all reported items within the checklist. Hence if an item is reported in the annual report of the 
bank scores “1” and if otherwise it scores “0”); CHS: Internal ownership (Percentage of shares held by internal shareholders); NOCH-Factor: External ownership (Percentage of shares held by all 
external shareholders); BSIZE: Board size (Number of board members); INDEP: Independent directors (Number of non-executive directors on the board of directors); NON: Non-executive directors 
(Dummy variable 1 if board contains non-executive directors and otherwise 0); ACINDEP: Audit committee independence (Dummy variable; 1 if audit committee independence exists, and 0 otherwise); 
ACSIZE: Audit committee size (Number of audit committee members); ACMEET: Audit committee meetings (Number of audit committee meetings); GENDER: Gender (Number of females on the 
board); TENU: Tenure (Dummy variable 1 if the number of years the board member permanence on the board is above the sample median of 5 years, otherwise 0); EDUC: Education (Number 
of board members holding a PhD); DIVE: Diversity (Number of other nationalities of the board ); SIZE: Bank size (Natural logarithm of total assets); PROF: Profitability (Return On Assets). Note 
that ** and * indicate that there is a correlation significant at the 0.01 and at the 0.05 between the respective factors respectively. 
 
 
Table 3, the Pearson correlation matrix is deployed to measure the strength and the direction of the linear 
relationship between any two variables. The results above in the correlation coefficient demonstrate positive a 
significant correlation between voluntary risk disclosure and NOCH-Factor at a value of .411**. They also show 
the same relationship between diversity at a value of .375**, size at 479**, profitability at .271* and risk disclosure. 
Moreover, the correlation matrix indicates    a    negatively    significant     association between tenure at a value of 
-.356** and voluntary risk disclosure. However, the table shows that the highest correlation was between bank size 
and voluntary risk disclosure at .479. Table 4 shows that there are insignificant associations between CHS, board 
size, independent directors, non-executive directors, audit committee independence, audit committee size, audit 
committee meetings, gender, tenure and education with voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks. 
 
 
Table 4. Regression results for the corporate governance and the demographic variables 
 
 
Unstandardized coefficients 
t Sig. VIF B Std. Error 
(Constant) 
-0.135 0.230 -0.590 0.558 
 
CHS -0.000006660 0.001 -0.101 0.920 3.675 
NOCH-Factor +0.007 0.003 2.584 0.013 5.995 
BOARDSIZE -0.032 0.011 -2.911 0.006 3.070 
INDEP 0.010 0.006 1.582 0.121 3.098 
NON -0.003 0.005 -0.507 0.615 5.347 
ACINDEP -0.007 0.020 -0.332 0.742 2.170 
ACSIZE 0.010 0.009 1.031 0.309 2.325 
ACMEET +0.012 0.005 2.276 0.028 2.764 
GENDER +0.117 0.034 3.406 0.001 2.571 
TENURE -0.024 0.016 -1.485 0.145 1.766 
EDUCATION -0.022 0.016 -1.338 0.188 1.579 
DIVERSITY -0.005 0.028 -0.161 0.873 5.105 
SIZE +0.094 0.024 3.922 0.000 1.982 
PROF +2.644 1.047 2.525 0.016 2.316 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R square: 0 .576 
F value: 5.458 
Sig. 0.000 
This table presents the regression results for the corporate governance variables and the demographic traits used in the regression model for the 
sample banks in this investigation. RISKD: Risk disclosure score (based on an un-weighted disclosure index, where equal weights were attached to all 
reported items within the checklist. Hence if an item is reported in the annual report of the bank scores “1” and if otherwise it scores “0”); CHS: Internal 
ownership (Percentage of shares held by internal shareholders); NOCH-Factor: External ownership (Percentage of shares held by all external 
shareholders); BSIZE: Board size (Number of board members); INDEP: Independent directors (Number of non-executive directors on the board of directors); 
NON: Non-executive directors (Dummy variable 1 if board contains non-executive directors and otherwise 0); ACINDEP: Audit committee independence 
(Dummy variable; 1 if audit committee independence exists, and 0 otherwise); ACSIZE: Audit committee size (Number of audit committee members); 
ACMEET: Audit committee meetings (Number of audit committee meetings); GENDER: Gender (Number of females on the board); TENU: Tenure 
(1 if the number of years the board member permanence on the board is above the sample median of 5 years, otherwise 0); EDUC: Education (Number 
of board members holding a PhD); DIVE: Diversity (Number of other nationalities of the board ); SIZE: Bank size (Natural logarithm of total assets); PROF: 
Profitability (Return On Assets). Note that “+” indicates that there is a positive correlation or a proof of influence exists between the respective factors and 
“-“indicates that there is a negative correlation or proof. 
 
This study uses OLS regression analysis to examine the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi 
listed banks. The coefficients table above demonstrates the interrelationships between the voluntary risk disclosure 
score as the dependent variable and a number of other variables as independents. Thus, before conducting the 
regression analysis, multicollinearity was tested by employing the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to detect any 
noises in the model. When carried out for the purpose of this investigation, this statistical test gave no indication of 
multicollinearity problems as shown in the table above. Since the VIF did not exceed 10 for any variable in any 
model, it was concluded that collinearity was not a serious problem (Neter et al., 1983; Naser et al., 2006). Moreover, 
it can be seen from the regression results table above that there is a positive significant relationship between NOCH-
Factor, audit committee meetings, gender, size, profitability and voluntary risk disclosure. The coefficients on the 
 
 variables are positive and statistically significant at .05, .05, .01, .01 and .05, respectively. Also, the table shows 
that there is a negatively significant association between board size and voluntary risk disclosure, with a coefficient 
value of .01, while the rest of the independent variables of both corporate governance mechanisms and demographic 
traits are insignificantly correlated with voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia. 
 
8.DISCUSSION 
 
This investigation found that ownership structure has a significant effect on voluntary risk disclosure. These findings 
are in line with prior  empirical results that indicate banks with lower insider ownership (proxied by CHS) are not 
inclined to provide higher voluntary risk disclosure, whereas banks with higher outsider ownership (proxied by 
NOSH-Factor) are more prone to provide considerably higher levels of voluntary risk disclosure (Elshandidy et al., 
2013; Abraham and Cox, 2007). Also, these results are in line with both agency theory and signalling theory, which 
propose that directors are only driven to offer higher  levels of voluntary risk disclosure when there is a widely 
dispersed     ownership     structure     to      mitigate information asymmetries owing to external pressure (Mohobbot, 
2005; Owusu-Ansah,  1998), implying that H1 and 2 are empirically supported. Also, the coefficient on audit 
committee meetings is .012 and is significant at .05 significance level.  These findings show that banks with more 
frequent audit committee meetings are more motivated to disclose more risk information. These results are 
consistent with prior empirical findings (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Also, this 
outcome is consistent with agency theory, whereby internal and external monitoring practices complement each 
other in reducing agency conflicts and information asymmetry between different types of stockholders, implying 
that H8 is empirically supported. However, our results show that there is a negatively significant association between 
board size and voluntary risk disclosure, with a coefficient value at -.032 and significance at the .01 percent level. 
This is in line with some preceding research (Jia et al., 2009; Guest, 2009; Coles et al., 2008) as well as being 
concurrent with agency theory, which suggests that bigger boards are bad and corrupt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
owing to free rider problems, such as expanded decision making time, raised costs, poor communication and 
monitoring practices, which impact negatively on board performance in general and risk disclosure in particular. 
Therefore, we reject H3. Yet, the other corporate governance variables (CHS, INDEP, NON, ACINDEP and 
ACSIZE) are found to have an insignificant correlation with voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks. 
In terms of demographic characteristics, table 4 shows that banks with women on the top management board 
are more likely to disclose voluntary risk disclosure. The coefficient on gender is .117 and is significant at the .01 
significance level. This effect is consistent with the previous empirical findings of Ntim et al. (2013) and Allini et 
al. (2015). Also, Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Nielsen and Huse (2010) reported that women on top management 
teams influence decisions positively. Moreover, this is consistent with upper echelons theory, which proposes that 
top management demographic characteristics, such as gender, could influence strategic decision-making, implying 
that H9 is empirically supported. Our findings do not support demographic traits (TENU, EDUC and DIVE) having 
a significant relationship with voluntary risk disclosure is Saudi Arabian listed banks. 
Additionally, for the control variables, our findings report that size is correlated positively with voluntary risk 
disclosure at a .01 significance level. This relationship is consistent with a number of prior empirical investigations 
(Khlif and Hussainey, 2014; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). 
This relationship confirms that directors of bigger banks are more motivated to convey risk information to 
investors to differentiate their institution from smaller ones (Khlif and Hussainey, 2014). This association is also 
consistent with both agency theory and signalling theory, which advocate that bigger institutions lean towards 
reporting more risk information to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry between insider and outsiders. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on profitability is 2.644 and is significant at a  .05  percentage  level.  This effect is 
consistent with prior literature that examined profitability in relation to risk disclosure and observed the same 
findings (Deumes and Knechel 2008; Miihkinen, 2012; Khlif and Hussainey, 2014). This association between 
profitability and risk disclosure is also consistent with signalling theory. Helbok and Wagner (2006) and Linsely et 
al. (2006) confirmed that banks with superior risk management techniques tend to have greater levels of profitability, 
and hence directors have greater incentives to signal their performance and their capacity to manage risk 
successfully. 
 
9.CONCLUSION 
 
This investigation sought to empirically examine the impact of corporate governance and top team demographic 
traits on the levels of voluntary risk disclosure practices and to identify the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure 
practices in all Saudi listed banks from 2009 to 2013. The empirical findings show that banks of large size, high 
outsider ownership, high profitability, high regularity of audit committee meetings and mixed gender on the top 
management board of directors are more likely to demonstrate higher levels of voluntary risk disclosure practices. 
Also, the level of voluntary risk disclosure is negatively affected by board size. Moreover, as can be seen from the 
empirical findings of this investigation, external ownership, audit committee meetings, gender, size, profitability 
and board size are primary determinants of voluntary risk disclosure practices in listed banks on the Saudi Exchange 
 
 Stock Market (Tadawul), while the rest of the independent variables of both corporate governance mechanisms and 
demographic traits are insignificantly correlated with the levels of voluntary risk disclosure practices in Saudi 
Arabian listed banks. 
Our findings have several important implications, by informing banks’ stockholders, regulatory bodies and 
any other interested groups about the importance of corporate governance and demographic determinants, which can 
be used to augment voluntary risk reporting in the banking industry in an effort to ensure information adequacy and 
increased market efficiency. The reported findings should be useful to accounting and risk regulators by providing 
information about the inadequacies of risk disclosure in Saudi and a more complete picture of risk components and 
determinants in listed banks. While this study does not explore the risk profiles of Islamic banks directly, the results 
somehow propose that Islamic banks are more likely to be risk-averse than their non-Islamic counterparts suggesting 
a worthy field for future research. These implications could extend to the governance, board demography and risk 
disclosure literature by theoretically justifying and empirically investigating the implications of such determinants 
and theories in regards to voluntary risk disclosure in the banking sector. This focus is significant because it 
provides insights into the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure in banks that operate in an environment regarded 
as being invariably opaque. 
This study was limited to the employment of the annual report as this was regarded as the most important 
means of communication. Other available means in Saudi Arabia, such as interim reports, prospectuses, press 
releases and the Internet were not reflected in this study despite the possibility of them impacting upon the decision-
making processes. These means could provide significant data for future research on risk disclosure. Such results 
could determine similarities and differences across both means of the data sources. Another limitation is that this 
investigation only focused on a single setting, Saudi Arabia. An extension of this investigation may be to compare 
voluntary risk disclosure in other emerging markets in the Middle East. Such investigation would offer valuable 
insights into the literature on disclosure. In spite of the noted limitations, the study did offer important insights into 
the determinants of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi Arabia. 
This study suggests a number of other venues for future research. Firstly, research could extend over a longer 
period of time. Secondly, this study could be extended by conducting comparative studies with other countries, 
preferably in the Middle Eastern countries due to similarities in the settings in order to explore any differences in 
the determinants of risk disclosure across such countries. Thirdly, little is known about the traits of the top managers 
and top management teams of Saudi corporations and how their psychological and sociological attributes impact 
the voluntary risk disclosure practices of the organisations they manage. Additional research could also be 
undertaken to study the economic consequences of risk disclosure practices in annual reports (for example, the effect 
on prices leading earnings, cost of capital, analyst following, firm value and the characteristics of analysts' 
forecasts). 
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